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By Samuel Van Pelt*

No Fault Divorce:
A Re-examination of Nebraska Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Nebraska lawyers and judges have now had approximately two
and a half years' experience under the no fault divorce law.' Durig that period, the law has been the subject of scholarly comment,2 legislative modification, 3 and judicial interpretation, not to
mention day-to-day scrutiny and testing by divorce lawyers and
trial judges.
Although domestic relations law will always be changing to reflect current social and economic conditions, it is fair to say that
the no fault law has undergone its initial testing. It may be anticipated that the law will remain basically in its present form in the
years ahead. With few exceptions, the law has been favorably received by bench, bar and litigants, and there is no serious movement within the state to return to the fault concept of divorce.
Thus, it is appropriate to comment on the daily operation of the
present law and analyze legislative amendments and Nebraska Supreme Court interpretations.
H. PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A.

Application for Temporary Support and Fees

After filing the petition for dissolution, the first court proceeding is usually a hearing, on the application for temporary allowances. The Nebraska statutes provide that the court may order either party to pay temporary support for the other party and their
Judge, Third Judicial District of Nebraska. B.A., 1957, LL.B., 1961,
University of Nebraska.
1. L.B. 820, 82d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1972) became effective July 6, 1972,
and now appears at Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-347 to -79 (Reissue 1974).
2. Henderson, Practice and Problems Under Nebraska's New Divorce
Laws, 52 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, 7 Cimioro L. REV. 369 (1974);
Note. Alimony Awards Under No Fault Divorce Statutes, 53 NEB. L.
REv . 126 (1974).
3. L.B. 961, 83d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974); L.B. 1015, 83d Neb. Leg., 2d
Sess. (1974).
*
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minor children. 4 It is further provided that the application shall be
accompanied by a statement of the applicant's financial condition
and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, a statement of the
other party's financial condition. 5 The temporary support order
may not be entered before three days notice of the hearing and after
service has been accomplished, unless notice is waived. Section 42357 originally provided that the order could not be entered until
three clear days after notice of hearing. L.B. 1015 amended section
42-357 to provide that orders could not be entered "before three
days."6 The intention of this amendment is not entirely clear,
and section 42-357 should be further clarified by substituting "seventy-two hours" for "three days."
A statutory provision often overlooked by counsel in connection
with temporary support applications is section 28-446.03, which7
specifies a support obligation of a stepfather for his stepchildren.
Although the history of such provisions indicates they were designed to aid county attorneys in criminal support actions, the statute by its terms imposes civil liability as well. Thus, it would be
proper for the court to allow temporary child support for a stepchild, even though the final decree cannot continue the support,
since the stepparent relationship (and consequent support obligation) terminates when the decree becomes effective.8
Although section 42-359, which provides for submission of financial statements, does not specifically preclude personal testimony, trial courts are well-advised to determine temporary support
applications by affidavit only. At this early stage of the divorce
proceeding, the parties are usually hostile and a temporary support
hearing is often their first confrontation after filing. Unless these
facts are presented by affidavit, hostility may hamper an effective
determination and disposition of the temporary support question.
There is an increasing tendency throughout the country to use
schedules in determining the amount of temporary support payments. Although some courts closely follow these schedules,9
judges in Nebraska's Third Judicial District use a schedule as a
guide, but will deviate from its provisions upon a showing of special
iEB. REv. STAT. § 42-357 (Reissue 1974).
5. Id.§ 42-359.
6. See L.B. 1015 § 2, 83d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974), amending, NEB. R!v.
STAT. § 42-357 (Reissue 1974).
7. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-446.03 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
8. See H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DomsTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 6.2 at 189 (1968).
9. In Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, for example, the schedule is adhered
to strictly. Attorneys simply present affidavits to a bailiff or other
court clerk who makes the necessary computations and enters a support order for the court's signature.
4.
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circumstances. Any schedule should be reviewed at least annually,
and adjusted based upon a sufficient change in the All Items Consumer Price Index.' 0 As domestic relations dockets become more
congested, attorneys may expect greater use of such schedules and
more abbreviated proceedings generally.
Nothing in the new law would appear to change the common
law rule that a wife may legally obligate her husband for the necesseries of life, in the absence of an award for temporary alimony.
Where a temporary allowance has been decreed, however, a husband may not be held liable for debts for necessaries of life incurred by the spouse."
B. Temporary Custody
The court may enter an ex parte order determining the temporary custody of any minor children of the marriage. 2 This is
one of the court's broadest powers and although it is a necessary
procedure in isolated instances, it should be used sparingly and
with caution. Where time does not permit a full hearing, the trial
court should set the application for temporary custody for hearing
on affidavits, instead of proceeding ex parte. Only in cases of child
abuse or gross neglect, or other instances where time simply does
not permit delay, should the court change custody ex parte. The
affidavits submitted by the parties should state, inter alia, who
presently has custody of the minor, and who has had custody for
most of the preceding six months. Unless a strong showing is made
to the contrary, it is ordinarily in the minor's best interests to remain with the custodial parent during the proceedings to avoid uprooting him until a final determination is made. Many parties and
attorneys wish to litigate the issue of temporary custody as fully as
they would litigate permanent custody. However, since most contested divorce cases are heard from 60 to 120 days after filing, few
custody questions are so critical that their resolution cannot be delayed until the final hearing.
C. Exclusion from the Premises
One of the most desirable modifications contained in the no
fault law is the last sentence of section 42-357, which provides that
10. The schedule used in the Third Judicial District was prepared from
data received from the University of Nebraska Home Economics Department, actual cases, and United States military allotment schedules.
11. See, e.g., Acton v. Schoenauer, 121 Neb. 62, 236 N.W. 140 (1931); Wise
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Peyton, 99 Neb. 48, 154 N.W. 838 (1915). For
a more comprehensive discussion of this rule in other jurisdictions, see
Holiday Hosp. Assgn v. Schwarz, 166 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App.
1964).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-357 (3) (Reissue 1974).
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after motion, notice to the other party's attorney, and hearing,
either party may be excluded from the family dwelling upon a
showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.
This added the requirements of notice and hearing to the exclusion procedure. Further, it has eliminated the inequitable situation
under the old law which caused a party, usually the husband, to
come home from work and find that not only had he been sued for
divorce but that he was prohibited by law to enter his own home,
8
to visit his wife and children, or to collect his personal belongings.
The new provision has worked well, and the notice requirement
has had the practical effect of substantially decreasing the number
of exclusion orders sought.
An order may be entered ex parte restraining either party from
molesting or disturbing the peace of the other party. 14 Because notice and a hearing are now required before a party may be excluded from the premises, this provision protects a party from
harm pending the hearing. The temporary restraining order
should be carefully restricted to the statutory language, and attorneys should not be allowed to broaden the scope of the statute by
including unnecessary or excessive language.
Section 42-357 also protects property interests pending the hearing. Either party may be ordered ex parte to refrain from transferring or disposing of assets, except in the usual course of business
or for necessaries of life. Although an order may be entered ex
parte, it remains in force for no more than ten days or until a hearing is held, whichever occurs first.
III. DISSOLUTION TRIAL
A. Uncontested Cases
In uncontested cases, the issues are relatively simple. The following jurisdictional prerequisites should be established before the
hearing.
1. One of the parties must1 5 be a resident of the county
in which the suit is brought.
2. One of the parties must have actually resided in the
state with the bona fide intention of making the state his
permanent home for at least one year, unless the parties
were married in the state and one party has resided in the
state continuously from the time of the marriage.' 6
13. NiEB. REV. STAT. § 42-309, repealed by L.B. 820 § 35, Neb. Laws (1972).
14. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 42-357(2) (Reissue 1974).
15. Id. § 42-348.

16. Id. § 42-349. The constitutionality of this provision was upheld by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Ashley v. Ashley, 191 Neb, 824, 217 NW,2d
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3. The petition
must contain certain allegations prescribed
17
by statute.
4. Service of process must have been accomplished either
by personal service if within the state; or personal notice
if out of the state; by publication subsequent to an order if
the respondent's whereabouts are unknown; or by a voluntary appearance by the respondent.' s
5. Sixty days must have elapsed since the date of service,
the filing of the voluntary appearance, or the last date of
publication.' 9
In a default or uncontestesed divorce it must be determined at
the hearing that (1) the marriage is irretrievably broken, (2) every reasonable effort has been made to effect a reconciliation, and
(3) the property settlement is not unconscionable.
If both parties state under oath that the marriage is irretrievably broken, or one party so states and the allegation is not denied
by the other party, this is probably conclusive. 20 If either of the
parties denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the matter
926 (1974).

Further, the United States Supreme Court has recently

sustained the validity of Iowa's one year residency requirement.
Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975). This should remove doubts concerning the validity of state residency requirements in this area. The
Court reasoned that Iowa's durational residency requirement violated
neither the equal protection nor due process clauses of the United
States Constitution because the one year requirement did not involve
an irrevocable loss of the right to obtain a divorce. Further, the Court
found that Iowa had a public policy interest in matters concerning the
custody and support of children and in avoiding the possibility of becoming a "divorce mill." Finally, the Court found a state interest in
ensuring that divorce decrees would not be subject to collateral attack
in other states on the basis that there was no bona fide domicile in
Iowa at the time the divorce was granted.
17. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-353 (Reissue 1974) requires that the petition include the following:
(1) The name and address of petitioner and his attorney;
(2) The name and address, if known, of respondent;
(3) The date and place of marriage;
(4) The name and date of birth of each child whose custody
or welfare may be affected by the proceedings;
(5) If the petitioner is a party to any other pending action

for divorce, separation, or dissolution of marriage, a statement
as to where such action is pending;

(6) A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, including
adjustment of custody, property, and support rights; and
(7) An allegation that the marriage is irretrievably broken.
18. Id. § 42-348.
19. L.B. 1015 § 3, 83d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974), amending NEB. Rsv. STAT.
§ 42-363 (Reissue 1974).
20, NEB, R v, STAT. § 42-361 (1) (Reissue 1974),
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should not proceed as a default, and should be set for hearing as a
contest. Although at an uncontested hearing some statement of the
specific problems burdening the marriage is helpful to the court,
particularly in determining whether efforts to effect a reconciliation have been made,21 such a statement is probably not necessary
in determining whether the marriage is irretrievably broken, as
long as one of the parties so states under oath.
Although the court must find that all reasonable efforts to effect a reconciliation have been made before a decree of dissolution
may be entered, this finding is no longer necessary to waive the
22
six months waiting period.
Despite the statutory language, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has made at least one exception. In Condreay v. Condreay23 the
court stated that no effort to reconcile need be made where one of
the parties is incarcerated for a period of time and it would be unreasonable to attempt reconciliation under the circumstances. How
far beyond its facts Condreay may be extended remains to be seen,
as each case should be determined upon its own facts. The court
should consider, among other things, the length of the marriage,
how long problems have existed, how much time has passed since
the filing of the action and since the most recent separation of the
parties, whether minor children are involved, whether the parties
have been previously separated, and any specific attempts at reconciliation such as marriage counseling, discussion among parties,
family and friends, trial separations, and trial reunions.
After excepting terms providing for the support and custody of
minor children, section 42-366(3) states that the property settlement
agreement "shall be binding upon the court unless it finds, after
considering the economic circumstances of the parties, and any
other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that the agreement is unconscionable."2 4 In spite of the broad authority conferred on the trial court
by this statute, the court should not substitute its judgment for
that of the parties or their counsel. A settlement is not unconscionable merely because it results in a "bad deal" for one party.
There are at least two instances, however, where the settlement
should be scrutinized. First, where one party is not represented by
counsel the court should examine the merits of the settlement to
determine whether one party has overreached the other. Sec21. Id.§ 42-360.
22. Id.
23. Condreay v. Condreay, 190 Neb. 513, 209 N.W.2d 357 (1973).

24. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-366 (2) (Reissue 1974).

DIVORCE
ond, where the parties agree to provide little or no child support,
there is often an unwritten understanding that the wife will apply
for public assistance in the norm of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"). Such a practice is unconscionable as to taxpayers and violates public policy. Therefore, it is a legitimate concern of the court. It can be prevented if the court, in every case
where the agreed-upon child support falls below minimum levels,
asks the wife, under oath, whether she is receiving or intends to
apply for AFDC benefits. If she admits that she intends to seek
welfare benefits, and the husband's earning capacity warrants
the contribution of a larger sum, the agreement should be disapproved. If she denies that she intends to apply for these benefits,
the local welfare office should be alerted to notify the court if application is made. Where the husband's earning capacity does not
appear to warrant a larger payment, or if the evidence discloses
that the wife is capable of supporting the child by independent
means, then the agreement should be approved.
B. Contested Cases
In contested cases, just as in uncontested cases, the court must
find that the marriage is irretrievably broken and that every reasonable effort to effect a reconciliation has been made. If a dispute
exists, a determination must be made regarding alimony, division
of property, and custody and support of minor children.
The statute sets forth conditions for determining upon the statements of the parties whether there has been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Section 42-361 provides:
(1) If both of the parties by petition or otherwise have stated
under oath or affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably
broken, or one of the parties has so stated and the other has not
denied it, the court, after hearing, shall make a finding whether
the marriage is irretrievably broken.
(2) If one of the parties has denied under oath or affirmation
that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall consider
all relevant factors, including the circumstances that gave rise to
the filing of the petition, and the prospect of reconciliation, and
shall make a finding whether the marriage is irretrievably
broken. 25
The distinction between subparagraph one and subparagraph two
would appear to be one without a rational difference. Subparagraph one should either provide that the court must or shall find
the marriage to be irretrievably broken under the articulated conditions, or the entire section should be repealed and replaced with
the following:
25. Id. § 42-361.
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The court, after hearing, shall consider all relevant factors, including the circumstances that gave rise to the filing of the petition and the prospect of reconciliation, and shall make a finding

whether the marriage is irretrievably broken.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not stated precisely what constitutes an irretrievable breakdown and such a statement may not
soon be forthcoming, because this issue is very seldom contested
and appealed. However, as a practical matter, if one party insists
that the marriage is irretrievably broken, even if the other attempts to contradict this asertion, most courts would find the marriage to be irretrievably broken, particularly after a contested
trial.26
As in uncontested cases, before a dissolution decree may be entered, the court must find that every reasonable effort to effect a
reconciliation has been made and has failed. The same considera27
tions discussed above apply to contested cases.
1.

Division of Propertyand Alimony

Section 42-351 gives the court jurisdiction to render judgments
concerning the division of property. Until the passage of L.B.
1015,2 little was said in the statute regarding marital property, ex29
cept that settlement agreements had to be approved by the court.
L.B. 1015 inserts the words "division of property" into section 42365, which previously related only to alimony. This amendment is
significant because it places the division of property on an identical
basis with the awarding of alimony, and makes the criteria for
awarding alimony applicable to the division of property as well.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently held in Sullivan v. Sullivan
that "[t]he division of property and alimony may be considered
together."30 Both the statute and Sullivan indicate that attorneys
and trial courts may treat alimony and division of property as
part of the same question, rather than separately, as has been the
practice in the past.
The division of property in contested trials in the Third Judicial
District is expedited by entering a pretrial order which requires
the parties to set forth relevant information regarding all items of
real and personal property, as well as the income of each of the
26. For a general discussion of cases from other jurisdictions setting forth
criteria for determining "irretrievable breakdown," see ANNoT., 55
A.L.R.3d 581 (1974).
27. See text accompanying notes 22 and 23 supra.
28. See note 6 supra.

29. NEB.REv. STAT. § 42-366(4) (Reissue 1974).
30. 192 Neb. 841, 843-44, 224 N.W.2d 542, 543 (1975).
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parties for the preceding three years. Responses to the pretrial
order are marked as exhibits and offered at the trial, and opposing
counsel may cross-examine the parties regarding the information
contained in the exhibit. Evidence adduced in this manner, rather
than orally by question and answer, saves considerable trial time
and is likely to be more accurate.
Section 42-365 explicitly sets forth the criteria to be considered
in awarding alimony.31 These criteria are largely a codification of
the common law.3 2 One criterion recently added by the legislature,
that of "interruption of personal careers or educational opportu3
nities" reflects the sentiment expressed in Magruder v. Magruder."
This standard would appear to be directed toward domestic situations where the parties marry at an early age without completing
their educations or professional careers. The wife works to support the family, while the husband completes his education and advances professionally. Ultimately, the husband feels that he has
outgrown his wife and wishes to dissolve the marriage.
Although Magruder has been criticized for interjecting the fault
concept into the no fault law,3 the majority opinion reflects the
concern now embodied in the statute that educational and professional sacrifices made by the wife should be compensated. This criterion does not necessarily punish the husband for his fault in desiring to dissolve the marriage. In such a case it is logical to allow alimony for a specific period of time to enable the wife to reestablish herself and complete the education that was interrupted by
the marriage.
A similar concept was recently stated in Krejci v. Krejci,35
which involved a marriage late in life and of relative short duration. The court allowed the wife a lump sum, not expressly referred to as alimony, to "reestablish herself."3 6 This holding, which
compensates the wife for the interruption of the professional ca31.

32.
33.
'34.
35.
36.

When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order payment of such alimony by one party to the other as
may be reasonable, having regard for the circumstances of the
parties, duration of the marriage, and the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interest of any minor children in the custody
of such party.
Id.§ 42-365.
See Mandelberg v. Mandelberg, 187 Neb. 844, 195 N.W.2d 148 (1972);
Fry v. Fry, 186 Neb. 521, 184 N.W.2d 636 (1971).
190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
See Note, 53 NEB. L. REv. 126 supra note 2; see also Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 578, 209 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1973) (White, C.J., dissenting).
191 Neb. 698, 217 N.W.2d 470 (1974).
Id. at 702, 217 N.W.2d at 472.
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reer and life that existed before her marriage, is consistent with
both the new statutory language and with Magruder.
Since Magruder, several alimony cases have been decided which
should allay the fears of Magruder's staunchest critics.37 In Barnes
v. Barnes38 the court rejected the wife's claim for increased alimony based upon decisions existing prior to the enactment of the
no fault law, stating that the court is "not necessarily bound" by
cases decided under the prior law. This decision appears to
strengthen the criteria for awarding alimony specifically enunciated
in the statute.
The alimony question is related to the women's liberation movement, and particularly to its primary objective of achieving social
and economic equality between the sexes. Until recently, marriage laws reflected a traditional or "unliberated" view of women by
allowing them to benefit from several presumptions. The laws assumed ithat mothers were usually more fit than fathers to have
custody of children; that wives had no money to maintain a divorce
action or pay their attorney's fee; and that women were incapable
of economic independence and therefore entitled to a life-time annuity called alimony.
When women achieve economic equality with men, the logic for
these preferences will diminish or disappear. The presumption regarding custody of minors has already fallen by the wayside. 89 In
the current transitional period, unliberated wives who stay at home
with children, taking care of the house, and who have developed
neither a profession nor earning capacity, receive more substantial alimony awards, while wives with careers and earning capacity receive little or no alimony. Further, liberated wives may
well be ordered to pay alimony to their husbands when circumstances warrant it.
2.

Custody and Support of Minors

The new no fault law40 did not substantially change prior statutory or common law relating to custody and support of minors. As
amended by L.B. 1015, however, section 42-364 now sets forth crite37. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 192 Neb. 735, 224 N.W.2d 361 (1974); Barnes
v. Barnes, 192 Neb. 295, 220 N.W.2d 22 (1974); Reisig v. Reisig, 191
Neb. 612, 216 N.W.2d 731 (1974); Seybold v. Seybold, 191 Neb. 480,
216 N.W.2d 179 (1974); Casselman v. Casselman, 191 Neb. 138, 214
N.W.2d 278 (1974).
38. 192 Neb. 295, 220 N.W.2d 22 (1974).
39. L.B. 1015 § 4(c) (2), 82d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974), amending NEB.
REv. STAT. § 42-364 (Reissue 1974).
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ria which had not previously been codified, but which had generally been followed as part of the common law.40 In addition, the
Nebraska Supreme Court, with Chief Justice White writing for the
majority, recently enunciated the following additional criteria:
Many factors may be considered in light of the particular circumstances of each individual case. The general considerations of the
moral fitness of the parents, or respective environments offered
by each parent, the emotional relationship between the children
and their parents, their age, sex, and health, the effect on the
children of continuing or disrupting an existing relationship, the
attitude and the stability of character of each parent, and the
capacity to furnish the physical care and education and needs4 of
the children are some of many factors for the court to consider. '
All of these criteria should guide attorneys in preparing relevant
evidence in custody cases, and will assist courts in determining custody isssues.
In addition to adhering to the guidelines established by the statute and cases, additional information should be ascertained by the
trial court pursuant to its own investigatory powers, 4 2 if not submitted in evidence by the attorneys:
1. An evaluation of the physical and mental health of the
minor and the proposed custodial parents.
2. A complete profile of the proposed custodians' social
background including military service, employment, residence, earning capacity, social and recreational activities,
and criminal conduct.
3. A detailed proposal for the minor's care by the proposed custodian and its relationship to the occupational and
recreational activities of the proposed custodian, particularly respecting the amount and quality of personal supervision that will be devoted to the minor.
40. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Reissue 1974) now provides:

(1) In determining with which of the parents the children,
or any of them, shall remain, the court shall consider the
best interests of the children, which shall include, but not
be limited to:
(a) The relationship of the children to each parent prior to
the commencement of the action or any subsequent hearing;
(b) The desires and wishes of the children if of an age of
comprehension regardless of their chronological age, when
such desires and wishes are based on sound reasoning; and
(c) The general health, welfare, and social behavior of the
children.
41. Christensen v. Christensen, 191 Neb. 355, 358, 215 N.W.2d 111, 114
(1974).
42. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-351 (Reissue 1974).
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4. The history of the relationship between the proposed
custodians and the minor.
5. The minor's preferences regarding custody.
6. The underlying motivations for custody on the part
of each proposed custodial parent.
One of the most desirable provisions of the new law authorizes
the appointment of an attorney to represent minor children, and
43
gives him the power to investigate and call witnesses at the trial.
Although the trial court probably has always had an inherent
power to appoint a guardian ad litem when this would be in the
best interests of the minor, the new statute has resulted in greater
use of this practice.
Where trained social workers are available, the appointed attorney should use their services for the investigatory work. Investigations can be conducted less expensively and usually more efficiently by a trained social worker, and the ethical problems which
testify as a witness regardarise when an attorney is required to
44
ing his own investigation are avoided.
The investigation report, whether from a court-appointed attorney, a social worker, or both, is one of the court's most useful tools
in determining the question of child custody. There are, however,
evidentiary problems concerning the use of this report at trial,
which have not been fully resolved by statute or court decision.
Section 42-358 states that the attorney may make an independent investigation, but it does not expressly allow the investigation
to be received into evidence over objections such as hearsay.
When a report contains information damaging to one of the proposed custodians, counsel for such party is likely to make one of
these objections.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if the
trial court does not expressly find or state that it considered an investigation report, there is a presumption that it was not considered
direct answer
if it is, in fact, incompetent evidence. 43 A 4 more
6
to the problem is found in Schuller v. Schuller.
The statute clearly authorizes the trial court, since the children are
wards of the court, to make an independent investigation of the

living conditions and the environment and care of minor children.
43. Id. § 42-358.

44. A.B.A. CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RFSPONsiBIrY,

D.R. 5-102, E.C. 5-9, E.C.

5-10 (1969).
45. See, e.g., Christensen v. Christensen, 191 Neb. 355, 359, 215 N.W.2d 111,
114-15 (1974).
46. 191 Neb. 266, 268-69, 214 N.W.2d 617, 619-20 (citation omitted).
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It contemplates that in a proper case such a report may be taken
into consideration and .given weight by the trial judge. It follows
that the trial court, in such a case, should submit its report to
counsel for examination and further hearing where it forms a
basis for the conclusions and judgment entered as to the disposition
of the children. In this case the District Court found that he [sic]
did not rely upon the objectionable parts of the report, and it is the

settled law of this state that there is a presumption that the court,
trying a case without a jury, in arriving at a decision, will consider such evidence only as is competent and relevant, and the
Supreme Court will not reverse a case so tried because other evidence was admitted, when there is material, competent, and relevant evidence admitted sufficient to sustain a judgment of the
trial court.

In view of the statute and the supreme court interpretations
to date, the best procedure is for the trial court to submit copies
of all reports to counsel, and then state for the record whether the
report will or will not be considered in the custody decision. If the
court expressly states that the report will not be considered, nothing further need be done. But, if the court states that the report
will be considered, each party should have an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence, in accordance with Schuller. Then, the report should be marked as an exhibit by the minor's attorney, either before or after the opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence
has been given, and offered as evidence.
If objection is then made to the report, counsel should be instructed to make specific objections to specific portions. If such
portions contain incompetent evidence, the court should rule only
on those portions rather than refuse to receive the entire report.
From a practical standpoint, when counsel are given full opportunity to read the report and offer rebuttal evidence, they are less inclined to make objections. If no objections are made, the court
may consider the report, regardless of its evidentiary competence.
Above al, the trial court should be careful never to consider secret
reports or investigations which have not been subjected to a procedure similar to that just described.
It is extremely beneficial in custody cases for the trial court to
visit with the minors involved, preferably in chambers on a relaxed, informal basis. This should not be done, however, in the
absence of a stipulation by counsel for all parties. Although the parties may not be willing to stipulate to a conference solely between
the court and the minors, they might approve a conference in
chambers, on or off the record, or even in the presence of counsel,
but not in the presence of the parties. Any procedure which avoids
the minors testifying in the courtroom in the presence of all parties
and spectators is highly desirable; minors are open and candid in

40

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 1 (1975)

direct proportion to the informality and confidentiality of the
surroundings.
In troublesome custody cases, after the decree has been entered,
it is often advisable to continue the involvement of the minor's attorney or the social worker, or both, on a supervisory basis. 47 A
trial court has continuing jurisdiction, as well as a moral obligation, to see that minors are protected after the decree. 48
IV. POST-DECRETAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Petitions to Modify
A decree of dissolution may be modified or vacated by the district court within six months of its entry,4 8a but that power does
not survive an intervening order of the Supreme Court involuntarily dismissing an earlier appeal of the decree.4 8 b Before the no fault
law, a modification of a decree could be initiated either by motion
to modify or by formal petition. 49 The new law does not expressly
provide for one procedure or the other, or specifically state that
service of process is a prerequisite to such an action. However,
section 42-365, discussing modification of orders for alimony, states
"prior to the date of service of process on a petition to modify,"
implying that a modification should be initiated by a petition after
service of process, rather than upon motion and notice as has previously been the case. If this was the intent of the legislature it
should be clarified.
Because the court has continuing jurisdiction over the best interests of minors, and there is express statutory authority for modification of maintenance and custody orders, the most common petition to modify involves the custody and support of minor children.50 The new law does not alter the preexisting common law
in that a material change of circumstance since the decree was entered must be shown.r' However, the discovery of material facts
which existed but were unknown to the trial court and the opposing party and could not have been ascertained with reasonable diligence, constitute a change of circumstance which the court may
consider. 51a A material change in circumstance regarding the
47. See Lewis v. Lewis, 192 Neb. 266, 219 N.W.2d 910 (1974)

(approving

this procedure).
48. Roach v. Roach, 192 Neb. 268, 220 N.W.2d 27 (1974).

48a. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-372 (Reissue 1974).
48b. Dewey v. Dewey, 192 Neb. 676, 223 N.W.2d 826 (1974).
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-340 (Reissue 1960); Hammond v. Hammond, 103
Neb. 860, 174 N.W. 865 (1919).
50. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-364 (Reissue 1974).
51. Gray v. Gray, 192 Neb. 392, 220 N.W.2d 542 (1974).
51a. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 193 Neb. 76, - N.W.2d - (1975).
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amount of support to be paid is easier to prove than the change of
circumstances necessary to provide the basis for changing custody.
With the considerable inflation of recent years, most wives seeking
increased child support have little difficulty in proving increased
expenses in raising children, as well as increased earning power of
the ex-husband.
The party seeking a change in custody must show a material
change in circumstance, not simply that the change would be in
the best interests of the minor children. In Gray v. Gray5 2 the
Nebraska Supreme Court recently stated that remarriage is not a
material change in circumstances, because the parties could and
should have contemplated remarriage at the time of divorce. The
court probably meant that remarriage, standing alone, is not a sufficient change in circumstance to warrant reconsideration of custody, but counsel and trial courts should take care not to extend
Gray beyond its particular facts. On the contrary, remarriage of
either parent, and particularly the relationship of the second spouse
to the minor, whether positive or negative, is a relevant factor
which could not be predicted or considered at the time the original
decree was entered.53 Generally, fhe Nebraska Supreme Court
has been extremely reluctant to change custody where the present
54
custodian is fit.

The new statute is explicit concerning modification of alimony
payments. Except as to amounts which have accrued before the
date of service of a petition to modify, alimony orders may be
modified or revoked for good cause where alimony was not allowed
in original decree, however, the decree may not be modified to
award alimony. 55 To ensure the availability of alimony in the future, counsel representing the wife is well-advised to provide for
nominal alimony in the original decree. An unqualified allowance of alimony in gross entered before July 6, 1972, whether payable immediately in full or periodically in installments, and
whether intended fully as property settlement or allowance for support, or both, is not subject to modification.5 6
The new law expressly provides that the decree may preclude
or limit modification of the property settlement agreements, except
those provisions concerning the support and custody of minor chil52. 192 Neb. 392, 220 N.W.2d 542 (1974).
53. Erks v. Erks, 191 Neb. 603, 216 N.W.2d 742 (1974).
54. Fenner v. Stricldand, 192 Neb. 114, 219 N.W.2d 229 (1974); Boyles v.
Boyles, 191 Neb. 67, 213 N.W.2d 729 (1974). Compare Erks v. Erks,
191 Neb. 603, 216 N.W.2d 742 (1974) (custody changed to mother).
55. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Reissue 1974).
56. Bryant v. Bryant, 191 Neb. 539, 216 N.W.2d 162 (1974).
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dren.57 By negative inference, this language would seem to state
that modification is available unless precluded by the decree. If
so, the decisions indicate that modification requires a showing of a
material change in circumstance not contemplated or foreseen by
the parties.5 8
B. Contempt Proceedings
After the petition to modify, the most frequently encountered
post-decretal proceeding is the contempt citation for failure to comply with the decree or orders of the court. These proceedings most
often relate to child support and visitation, although a contempt citation can be used to enforce any aspect of the court's order. 59
If a party violates a prior order, the adverse party should move
for an order to show cause setting forth ,the time and place at which
the party allegedly in violation must appear and present his version
of the controversy. Although the order states hat the respondent
must show cause why he should not be held in contempt, the moving party usually has the burden of coming forth with the evidence. If the cited party offers neither evidence nor a satisfactory
explanation, the court may find him in contempt only after a finding of "willful failure" to comply with the prior decree.6 0
Even in cases where willful and contumacious failure to comply
is found, the trial court should give the respondent a specified period of time to purge himself of the contempt by complying with
the prior decree or to meet additional conditions imposed by the
court. If a father is delinquent in his child support, the court
should take this opportunity to order him to pay an additional
amount in order to reduce the unpaid balance. If the cited party
fails to meet any of the court-imposed conditions, thus failing to
purge himself of the previously found contempt, he may then be
punished for contempt. This punishment may consist of imprisonment for a specified period or until the order is obeyed, or a fine,
or both.06 Finding a party in contempt is an extreme remedy, and
incarceration should be used only as a last resort.
Few pieces of domestic relations legislation have stimulated
greater comment than L.B. 961,62 which requires the clerk to sub57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-366 (7) (Reissue 1974).
58. Gray v. Gray, 192 Neb. 392, 220 N.W.2d 542 (1974).
59. For a discussion of enforcement of decrees, see Henderson, supra note
2, at 22-23.
60. Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 191 N.W. 704 (1922).
61. Nebraska Children's Home Soc. v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 78 N.W. 267
(1899).
62. L.B. 961 83d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974), amending NEB. REv. STAT. § 42358 (Reissue 1974).
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mit to the district court a list of all persons delinquent in the
payment of child support. The law further requires the court to
appoint an attorney to initiate contempt proceedings within ten
days and to prosecute offenders diligently. The law has been interpreted to apply only to decrees entered after July 6, 1972.63
Even so limited, over 600 of these cases have been certified in Lancaster County alone and several thousand in Douglas County. The
new law reflects the Legislature's concern over the impact of thousands of dollars of unpaid child support on the state welfare system.
C. Wage Earner Deductions, Support Accounting and
Temporary Support
The legislature's concern over unpaid child support is also reflected in sections 6 through 17 of L.B. 101564 which set forth a
procedure for withholding a portion of a parent's wages to apply
toward child support. This may be done only after notice and
hearing, and the court may withhold "such amount as shall reduce
and satisfy the ... arrearage." 65
The court may order an employer to refrain from firing the
employee as a result of wage earner deductions. 60 This system is a
desirable improvement over the use of garnishment or other collection proceedings, which in the past have often resulted in the
supporting parent being fired from his job, and consequently losing
his ability to support his children. Protective language should be
included automatically in every order witholding wages. An application for withholding may be filed by any person having a direct interest in the welfare of the child. 67 Persons specifically
named as having such an interest are a parent, legal guardian,
court-appointed custodian, county attorney, his deputies or assist63. See Op. ATf'Y GEN., May 21, 1974. In response to the question of how

far back in the records the Clerk of the District Court must go in fulfilling the requirements of a monthly report of all delinquent cases,

the Attorney General answered:

We think the answer is supplied by section 42-379, R.S.
Supp., 1972. It states in part that "Sections 42-347 to 42-379

shall apply to all proceedings commenced on or after July 6,

64.
65.
66.
67.

1972." It goes on to provide that those sections shall also apply to those actions pending on that date on which judgment
had not yet been entered, as well as to judgments modified
or on appeal after that date.
L.B. 1015 83d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974).
Id. § 2. The deduction is further limited to the weekly sum in excess
of 30 times the currently existing minimum wage. The present sum
is $60 and will become $69 in January 1976.
Id. § 6(5).
Id. § 7.
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ants, and any welfare office employee.0 8 The court itself is specifically prohibited from making such application. 9
Upon filing an application for a withholding order, a hearing must be held within three weeks.70
The employer is served
with a copy of the application, notice of the hearing and interrogatories which must be answered and filed three days before the
hearing.7' If the court finds it has jurisdiction over the employer
and the earnings in question, and further finds that the employee
has not fully complied with the support order, it may enter the
withholding order.7 2 This order may also provide for payment of
the applicant's attorney fees.7 3 The order may be revoked or
modified when good cause is shown, and terminates
automatically
7 4
thirty days after the employee ends his employment.
An interesting aspect of L.B. 1015 is section 4(3)7r which requires a custodial parent, after notice and hearing, to file a verified
report stating the manner in which the support money has been
expended. This provision is most desirable because it offers a vehicle for eliminating the use of support money by a custodial parent
for personal items, children by prior or subsequent fathers, and
other improper purposes, which through the years have caused considerable irritation and annoyance for the supporting parent. The
availability of this remedy should also eliminate one excuse often
advanced by fathers for nonpayment of child support.
Frequently, after a motion for new trial has been overruled,
and before a notice of appeal and praecipe is filed, the wife
will seek a continuation of temporary support pending appeal. Because the statute provides for the payment of temporary support
during the "pendency of the action"7 8 this 'has generally been interpreted to include final disposition on77 appeal, and the matter is
largely within the trial court's discretion.
Regarding child support and alimony, which is payable until a
certain date or until a person reaches a certain age, there is no
harm in and every reason for allowing payment during the appeal.
However, where alimony has been ordered in a lump sum or pay68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id. § 8.
71. Id.

72. Id. § 11.
73. Id. § 12.
74. Id.§ 15.
75. Amending NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Reissue 1974).
76. NEB.REv. STAT. § 42-367 (Reissue 1974).
77. Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973); Overton
v. Overton, 178 Neb. 267, 133 N.W.2d 7 (1965).
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able for a fixed number of years, any payments made pending appeal should be deducted from the final award to avoid double payment.
V.

CONCLUSION

As predicted by Professor Henderson,7 8 the new law has in fact
given the bench and bar more streamlined and efficient procedures
for dissolving marital unions. The initial impact of the new law
has been to increase the number of marriages dissolved.79 Whether
this is good or bad for our society remains to be seen Even
though the new law may have resulted in more dissolved marriages
and broken homes, it has not resulted in the docket congestion that
some anticipated.
By eliminating fault evidence, the average
length of a contested trial has been reduced substantially and more
cases can be processed in less time. Also, more cases appear to be
settled under the new law than the old law. This may be because
the parties are prohibited from airing their dirty linen, and are
more disposed to compromise their differences amicably. There is
one exception to this, however; now the party primarily "at fault"
feels free to contest matters of property or child custody, while under the old law he would have avoided the introduction of the damaging fault evidence and been more inclined to take whatever settlement his spouse would offer. Despite its imperfections, the no
fault law is a good law, and with continued judicial interpretation and legislative refinement, it should become even better.
78. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 23.
79. Data regarding the number of divorce complaints filed in the Third
Judicial District are collected in Table I.
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